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The transmission mechanism of monetary policy 




The Colombian economy underwent substantial changes over the last decade that affected 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in significant ways. After a protracted 
recession and a financial crisis, the economy, characterized by moderate, slowly declining 
inflation, a complex monetary regime, incipient financial asset markets and a credit surge, as 
depicted by Carrasquilla (1998), transformed into a low inflation economy with an inflation 
targeting regime and a relatively deep public bond market. This paper seeks to describe the 
main elements of this process. In the first part, an account of some of the major changes 
experienced by the Colombian economy is presented. In the second part, these changes are 
linked to the current features of the transmission mechanism. 
1.  Main changes in the Colombian economy affecting the 
transmission mechanism 
In 1997 CPI inflation in Colombia was 17.7% and had come down from 25.1% in 1992 
(Graph 1). The monetary policy strategy consisted of a system of “bands” for the exchange 
rate, the monetary aggregates and the interbank interest rate that were supposed to be 
consistent with an inflation target announced for the year. Since there could be conflict 
between the bands, an ordering of priorities was established, but it was not always followed 
in the face of some of the shocks that hit the economy later on. 
Aggregate expenditure had risen fast since 1992, following large capital inflows and low real 
interest rates between 1992 and the first half 1994. As a result, the current account deficit 
was 4.7% of GDP on average between 1993 and 1997, while financial system credit growth 
was above 16% in real terms between 1992 and 1995. The increase in mortgage credit was 
a considerable part of total credit growth and real estate real values climbed between 1992 
and 1995. Non-interest public expenditure also rose as a percentage of GDP from 17.4% in 
1990 to 30.6% in 1997.  
As a consequence, the Colombian economy was highly vulnerable to external shocks in 
terms of both income/expenditure flows and domestic/external stocks of debt. Private 
external debt went up from 6.6% of GDP in 1992 to 18.4% of GDP in 1997, while the ratio of 
financial system loans to GDP reached 43.1% in 1997, a large number when compared to an 
average of 30.5% between 1980 and 2006.  
In these circumstances, the terms of trade deteriorated in 1998 and private capital flowed out 
of the country between 1998 and 1999. There were strong pressures for currency 
depreciation. The exchange rate target zone was defended in 1998, but was finally devalued 
                                                  
1    Banco de la República Colombia. The ideas and opinions expressed in this document are the sole 
responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Banco de la República or its Board of 
Directors. The author is grateful to Julián Pérez and Franz Hamann for their comments and their help with the 
econometric exercises presented in the second section of the paper. 184  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
in August of that year, following the Russian crisis. Renewed pressures on the currency 
occurred in mid 1999. The target zone was devalued again and widened. Finally, in 
September 1999 the currency was allowed to float and the monetary policy regime 
converged to a full fledged inflation targeting strategy. A program was agreed with the IMF to 
stabilize the public debt ratios and to grant access to the scarce external funding. 
The external shock to such a vulnerable economy also produced a sharp drop in output and 
employment. GDP fell by more than 4% in 1999 and growth did not recover significantly until 
2003. Given the high degree of indebtedness of the private sector and the fragility of some 
segments of the financial system, a financial crisis ensued. All these events changed the 
transmission mechanism in substantial ways. In the remainder of this section, three key 
events will be described in some detail to provide an understanding of their influence on the 
current transmission mechanism.  
(a)  The fall of inflation 
Graph 1 shows that CPI inflation fell rapidly in 1999. It went from 16.7% in December 1998 to 
9.2% in December 1999, decreasing more in that year alone than in all the five previous 
years. This abrupt disinflation came as a surprise for the markets and the public (Table 1) 
and was associated with the recession that occurred in 1999 (Graph 2). In that year, 
investment fell by 38.6%, consumption decreased by 3.2% and the unemployment rate rose 
by 4.2 percentage points. Short term real interest rates had increased since early 1998, 
reaching record levels (17.3%) in November 1998, as a result of the rise in the country risk 
premia, as well as the efforts by the central bank to defend the exchange rate target zone. 
Since a real depreciation of the currency was required by the changing external conditions, 
non-tradable price annual inflation fell by 8.8 percentage points in 1999, while the price 
increases of the tradable sub-basket fell by 6 percentage points in that year. Rents, a large 
component of the non-tradable sub-basket, were particularly hard hit, with real decreases of 
5.1, 7.4 and 5.6 percentage points in 1999, 2000 and 2001, respectively. The financial crisis 
and the burst of a real estate bubble were behind such a drop in real rents. 
Between January 1998 and December 2000 the currency depreciated by 44.5% and 28.9% 
in nominal and real terms, respectively. As mentioned, inflation fell throughout the period, so 
the impact of depreciation on headline CPI inflation was insignificant. This reflected the need 
for a real depreciation, the reaction of the central bank and the response of the economy to 
increased external and domestic interest rates in the context of large imbalances.   
After 1999 the Central Bank followed a policy of gradual disinflation, setting decreasing 
annual targets that have been met most of the time (Graph 1). Some authors have argued 
that the disinflation of 1999 and beyond was “fortuitous” because the Central Bank took 
advantage of the considerable negative output gap that has prevailed throughout most of the 
present decade (Graph 2) (Clavijo, 2000). However, the very fact that the Central Bank did 
not try to set low interest rates in the midst of the crisis (with rising sovereign risk premia) or 
to increase inflation afterwards to stimulate the depressed economy sent a strong signal 
about the preferences and the long run targets of the policymakers. In particular, they 
showed the Central Bank’s willingness to achieve and keep low levels of inflation, indicating 
that the disinflation had been permanent. This was an important message, given Colombia’s 
long history of moderate inflation and the timid pace of disinflation before 1999. 
(b)  The adoption of an inflation targeting strategy 
Some elements of an inflation targeting (IT) regime were present in Colombia before 1999. 
Quantitative inflation targets had had to be announced by law since 1992. An internal 
Inflation Report was produced to guide the decisions of the Board of Directors. This report 
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was made in order to understand the short run determinants of inflation. The Inflation Report 
started to be published in December 1998. 
After the currency was allowed to float in September 1999, the decision was made to follow 
an IT strategy. Nevertheless, the limited knowledge of the transmission mechanism and the 
lack of instruments to predict or simulate the behavior of the economy over horizons longer 
than one year represented serious restrictions on the application of IT. In addition, money 
demand seemed to be stable, so initially, the IT strategy was accompanied by “reference 
paths” for M3 and the monetary base, like the ones used in the ECB. The idea was that the 
signals about the future course of inflation were to come from both the IT analysis and 
forecasts, and the deviations of the monetary aggregates from their “reference paths”. 
With time, however, the relationship between money growth and inflation changed (as 
illustrated below) and some demand functions turned unstable. Simultaneously, knowledge 
of the transmission mechanism was developed (Gómez et al, 2002), as well as instruments 
to forecast and simulate the behavior of the economy over longer horizons, conditional on 
monetary policy. Hence, the deviations of monetary aggregates from their “reference paths” 
were abandoned as a strong criterion for policy action and the monetary policy strategy 
converged to a full fledged IT regime. 
Within the IT framework, the main instrument of the Central Bank is its overnight repo 
interest rate. At the policy rate, the Central Bank provides (withdraws) all the liquidity 
demanded (supplied) by the financial system. The aim is to guide the overnight interbank 
rates and the banks’ deposit and loan interest rates toward levels deemed as consistent with 
the achievement of the inflation target 18–24 months ahead. The immediate effect of this 
change was the stabilization of the overnight interbank interest rates (Graph 3) and the 
production of a clear signal on the stance of monetary policy. Before, the interbank rates 
fluctuated widely because the Central Bank tried to set paths for the monetary aggregates or 
defended the exchange rate at the ends of the target zone.  
Up until 2002 the Central Bank set annual point inflation targets. Since 2003, it has set a 
±0.5% range target for the year ahead and has announced a wider range for the mid-point of 
the target two years ahead. This is consistent with the estimated horizon in which monetary 
policy has the largest effect on inflation (18–24 months). Also, the Central Bank announced a 
long term target of inflation between 2% and 4%. The successive announced ranges have 
been decreasing toward the long run target, as the Bank has explained to the public that it 
intends to gradually converge to it. As long as the credibility of the Central Bank’s inflation 
targets is enhanced, the policy described above may have implications on formation of prices 
and wages, altering the persistence of inflation, anchoring inflation expectations and making 
the accomplishment of the targets less costly. 
(c)  The financial crisis 
Some sectors of the financial system presented fragilities during the 1990s (Uribe and 
Vargas, 2003). Regulation and supervision of public owned banks and some financial 
cooperatives were weak. Risk management practices at those institutions were poor and 
many of them eventually failed when interest rates increased, unemployment rose and 
income fell.  
The mortgage banks were not sufficiently capitalized to reflect the credit risk associated with 
large increases in unemployment or falls in the real value of collateral (real estate). There 
was a mismatch between long run loans (partially indexed to the short run interest rate) and 
short term liabilities (interbank loans and CDs). Thus, mortgage banks’ profits were 
vulnerable to sharp shifts in short run interest rates. In addition, even though it was partial, 
the indexation of mortgage loans to the short run interest rate made the disposable income of 
indebted households quite sensitive to movements in interest rates.  186  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
In this context, the external shocks that led to skyrocketing foreign and domestic interest 
rates produced a marked deterioration of the financial situation of households and mortgage 
banks. All the abovementioned risks were realized, collateral values plummeted and many 
households stopped paying their debts. One large mortgage bank went bankrupt and 
required intervention by the Government. 
The financial crisis was to have important consequences for the transmission mechanism: 
•  The credit channel of transmission of monetary policy was severed, as the demand 
for credit was cut by highly indebted individuals and firms, while credit supply was 
restricted by a financial system that had an increased risk perception of the 
economy and whose capital had been hit by large losses (Echeverry and Salazar, 
1999, and Barajas and Steiner, 2002, among others). In this situation, the expansive 
monetary policy that followed the crisis had a limited impact on aggregate demand. 
At some point, its effect may have been restricted to the income effect on borrowers. 
This may be one of the reasons for the protracted recession of the Colombian 
economy (Graph 2). 
•  Given the increased credit risk perception and the deterioration of their capital, 
banks and other financial institutions turned to domestic public bonds as an 
alternative investment. The rapid growth of the private pension funds portfolios also 
contributed to the increase in the demand for public bonds. At the same time, the 
Government’s rising financial requirements, the restrictions in access to external 
funding and the need to reduce the Government’s foreign exchange exposure 
induced an increasing supply of public domestic bonds throughout the decade. The 
development of the public bond market has allowed the formation of a zero coupon 
curve, a key element for the pricing of financial assets. The importance of this 
change will probably be greater in the future, as the fixed rate, long run, private loan 
and bond markets expand (especially the mortgage loan market). More recently, the 
upsurge of public bond holdings by financial intermediaries has exacerbated their 
exposure to market risk (Vargas et al (2006)), making their asset portfolio 
adjustment an important element of the transmission mechanism in the short run.
2 
•  Securitization of mortgage loans emerged, encouraged by income tax exemptions 
on earned interest. There was a deliberate policy to develop this market, with the 
idea of better diversifying credit risk. Today the size of mortgage backed securities is 
around 38% of non-securitized mortgage loans. Most of these securities are held by 
banks.  
•  Mortgage loans were de-linked from short run interest rates, so a strong and fast 
connection between policy rates and household expenditure was broken. Today, 
mortgage loans are made at fixed rates or indexed to CPI inflation. Their importance 
in the transmission mechanism is still subdued, because of the process of debt 
reduction started by households after the crisis. 
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2.  Main features of the transmission mechanism 
The events described in the foregoing section had some effects on the responses of inflation 
to its macroeconomic determinants, the behavior of aggregate demand and the reaction of 
market interest rates to shifts in monetary policy. 
(a)  Determinants of inflation 
The permanent fall of inflation and the adoption of an IT regime had some consequences for 
the determination of inflation over short term horizons (two years or less): 
•  Expectations of sustained single-digit inflation and improvements in the credibility of 
the Central Bank’s targets have partially reduced inflation persistence and helped to 
anchor expectations.  
•  Falling inflation expectations and supply shocks have shifted the short-run Phillips 
curve. At the same time, lower and more stable inflation may have changed the 
sensitivity of the short-run aggregate supply to inflation surprises.  
•  Exchange rate flexibility and the credibility of a low inflation regime could have 
decreased pass-through from imported goods prices to CPI inflation. However, an 
increased degree of competition in the economy may have raised the pass-through 
from the exchange rate and foreign prices to imported good prices.  
•  Finally, the fall of inflation, some exogenous shocks and the new policy regime have 
blurred the short and medium term relationship between money growth and inflation. 
(i)  Inflation persistence and anchoring of expectations 
The literature on IT argues that one of the main advantages of this regime is the reduction of 
inflation persistence and the anchoring of expectations. If the inflation target is credible, 
indexation mechanisms and adaptive expectations should be weakened, as agents put more 
weight on the inflation target in the formation of prices and wages. Hence, shocks do not 
have permanent effects of inflation (Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2006a)).  
Inspection of the Colombian survey data indicates that the credibility of the inflation targets 
and the anchoring of expectations gradually improved after the fall of inflation and the 
adoption of IT (Table 2). Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2006b) also show that the 
consensus inflation expectations for 18–24 months ahead inflation have become closer to 
the inflation target since 2003, even though current inflation may have been higher than the 
future target.  
With respect to inflation persistence, typically two methods are used to assess its changes 
(Bergljot et al (2006)): 









•  Changes in the coefficients of “backward” and “forward” looking components of a 
Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve (HNKPC) (γb and γf): 
t t t b t t f t mc E μ + λ + π γ + π γ = π − + 1 1  
Here, persistence is attributed to inertia (“intrinsic persistence”), expectations (“expectation-
based persistence”) or the persistence of the deviations of marginal costs from their steady 
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Regarding the first method, three studies find mixed results, depending on the price index 
used (Table 3). According to these estimates, after 1999 persistence declined for the GDP 
deflator and CPI food and non-tradable inflation. Persistence remained high for CPI headline 
inflation as well as for tradable and regulated price inflation.
3 González and Hamann (2006) 
argue that the apparently still large degree of persistence in CPI inflation might be due to 
imperfect credibility and information, and a slow process of learning by the public about the 
“permanent component” of the inflation target.
4 They link this interpretation to the gradual 
pace of disinflation that has taken place in Colombia. 
On the other hand, estimates of the HNKPC coefficients seem to support the hypothesis that 
intrinsic persistence lost importance in favor of expectations-based persistence after 1999 
(Table 4).  
In sum, there is some evidence that the permanent fall of inflation and the adoption of an IT 
regime may have helped to anchor inflation expectations. The latter seem to have become 
more important in price formation, but persistence remains high for some price indices. It is 
worth recalling that inflation is not at its long run target yet, and that disinflation has been 
slow. Thus, obtaining all the benefits of low inflation and IT in terms of low “sacrifice ratios” 
will take more time in Colombia.  
(ii)  Shifts and “slope” of the short-run aggregate supply 
Decreasing inflation has led to decreasing inflation expectations and this has shifted the 
short-run Phillips curve in Colombia since 2000 (Graph 4).
5 More recently, supply shocks and 
the increased degree of competition in some sectors have also contributed to this movement. 
This is confirmed by the behavior of non-tradable prices inflation, presumably the component 
of the CPI that is most sensitive to the output gap. Graph 5 shows that the relationship 
between non-tradable inflation and the output gap breaks after 2000, as the output gap 
closes and inflation remains stable. However, when the relationship is corrected for inflation 
expectations,
6 the association becomes apparent (Graph 6). 
The “slope” of the short run aggregate supply (the response of inflation to the output gap) 
seems to have declined with the fall of inflation, although the evidence is less conclusive in 
this regard: 
•  Recursive OLS estimation of an aggregate supply equation points to a reduction of 
the output gap coefficient since the start of the disinflation process (1991), with an 
additional downward shift after 1997 (Graph 7). 
•  The estimations of the HNKPC presented above indicate a greater sensitivity of 
inflation to deviations of marginal costs from their steady state values after 1999 
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(Table 5). Since a positive relationship is expected between the output and the 
marginal cost gaps,
7 this result does not seem consistent with the previous one. 
Several stories can be told around both results. On the one hand, the opening of the 
Colombian economy during the early 1990s and the effects of globalization may explain the 
first finding (reduced sensitivity of inflation to the output gap), in line with the interpretation 
given to similar results in industrialized countries (Helbling et al (2006)). The idea is that with 
increased integration, domestic factors have become less important in explaining domestic 
prices, relative to global or external factors. On the other hand, the larger response of 
inflation to the marginal cost gap may indicate greater price flexibility in Colombia after 1999 
(among other things). This could be the result of a higher degree of competition in several 
sectors. However, this hypothesis would have to be validated by microeconomic data. 
An alternative, more “classical” interpretation of the diminished reaction of inflation to 
changes in the output gap has to do with the reduction of inflation and inflation volatility. The 
classic paper by Lucas (1973) suggests that the response of aggregate supply to nominal 
shocks depends on the ratio of the volatilities of individual relative prices and aggregate 
prices.
8 Table 6 shows that the ratio of the volatility of relative price changes to the volatility 
of inflation has increased for several sectors, as inflation and inflation volatility decreased in 
Colombia. 
(iii)  Exchange rate pass-through 
Graph 8 shows a decreasing recursive OLS coefficient of PPI imported goods price inflation 
in a core CPI inflation (aggregate supply) equation, suggesting a declining pass-through 
since 1991. Similar results are obtained from a Kalman filter estimation of a system 
comprising an equation for core CPI inflation and an equation for imported good prices 
(Graph 9, second panel). In contrast, the pass-through from exchange rate depreciation and 
foreign prices to imported good prices has apparently increased in the same period (Graph 9, 
first panel). 
The decreasing size of pass-through to CPI has been observed in many economies (eg Baqueiro 
et al (2003)) and has been attributed to a credible, low inflation environment (Taylor (2000)), 
among other things. Graph 8 suggests that it started to fall in Colombia with the beginning of 
the disinflation process (1991). However, given the slow speed of this process, a more 
plausible explanation of the decaying pass-through could be the adoption of a more flexible 
exchange rate arrangement.
9 In this context, shifts in the exchange rate are transferred to 
prices only if they are perceived to be persistent. A floating regime introduces uncertainty 
about the duration of a shock, hence moderating the pass-through.  
Curiously enough, according to Graph 8, the pass-through coefficient did not experience 
significant changes after 1999, when the currency floated, IT was adopted and inflation fell. 
Nonetheless, Graph 9 indicates that the pass-through has continued to fall throughout the 
past ten years. 
In contrast to the previous result, Graph 9 (upper panel) shows that the pass-through from 
the exchange rate and foreign prices to imported good prices has almost continually 
increased since 1991. Using sectoral data, Rincón et al (2005) find evidence of incomplete 
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pass-through from the exchange rate to manufactured imported goods, supporting the 
existence of non-competitive market structures. They also find unstable and non-decreasing 
pass-through coefficients for most of the sectors considered between 1995 and 2002. 
Interestingly, these coefficients rise after 1999 (some revert later, other do not), when a 
persistent depreciation of the currency took place. 
Non-decreasing pass-through coefficients to imported prices in a falling inflation, flexible 
exchange rate environment may signal an increasing degree of participation of imported 
goods suppliers in the manufactured goods markets. This is consistent with the opening of 
the economy in the 1990s. 
(iv)  Money and inflation in the short run 
The short-run relationship between money and inflation weakened in Colombia after the 
disinflation (Graph 10). Non linear effects of the reduction of inflation and nominal interest 
rates, as well as exogenous shocks (like an increasing debit tax) may help explain the real 
expansion of the monetary base. The dramatic increase of the real money demand has been 
accommodated by the Central Bank, given the policy regime. At the policy interest rate, all 
the money demanded is supplied, so the changes in the demand for money show up in the 
observed quantity of money. 
In addition, some money demand functions have turned unstable in their parameters. The 
effect of these events has been a reduced usefulness of money to understand or predict 
inflation developments.
10 More recently, however, González et al (2006) have found 
evidence of a greater contribution of money gaps (relative to the output gap) in the 
explanation of the deviation of inflation from its targets. 
(b)  Behavior of aggregate demand 
(i)  Sensitivity of aggregate demand to the interest rate 
The debt build-up and the ensuing financial crisis of the 1990s had some consequences for 
the behavior of aggregate demand. Interest rate sensitivity of aggregate expenditure rose 
with the increase in debt and was apparent during the recession of 1999. Graphs 11 and 12 
show that the debt ratios of households and firms reached their peaks around 1998. This 
made the private sector highly sensitive to interest rate shocks.  
When external conditions changed in 1998–1999 and interest rates went up, the effect on 
private demand was relatively large. In addition to the increased debt burden, real estate 
relative prices had been falling since 1996. Private consumption and investment fell sharply 
as interest rates climbed (Graphs 13 and 14). The recursive OLS coefficient of the real 
interest rate deviation from trend in an “IS curve” equation illustrates the enlarged sensitivity 
of aggregate demand to interest rate changes after 1999 (Graph 15). 
After 1999 real interest rates came down fast, while expenditure recovered slowly (Graphs 13 
and 14), reflecting the fragile financial situation of the financial and private sectors. As 
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mentioned in the previous section, firms and households entered in a process of debt 
reduction, while banks turned to public debt bonds as an alternative investment. Today, 
private sector indebtedness is lower and the recent expansion in investment has been 
financed mostly with internal savings (Table 7).
11 Since 2002, banks’ profits have recovered. 
Macroeconomic conditions and the stronger financial situation of both the private sector and 
financial intermediaries have allowed an acceleration of credit growth (especially consumer 
loans). Thus, a change in the trend of the private sector’s debt indicator has been observed 
(eg Graph 11). 
(ii)  Sensitivity of aggregate demand to the exchange rate 
Throughout the 1990s there were some changes that could have affected the “reduced form” 
relationship between output and the exchange rate (the “IS curve”): 
•  Capital controls were relaxed and the exchange rate regime was made more 
flexible. As a result, the short-run reaction of the economy after a shock could have 
changed, as well as the relevant types of shocks facing the economy. For example, 
an improvement in the terms of trade would no longer imply an expanding economy 
and pressures on inflation. Or deliberate policies to increase net exports through 
devaluations could have become less relevant in explaining the output-exchange 
rate relationship, as other shocks (eg capital account shocks) happen to be more 
important in the determination of the exchange rate and output dynamics. 
•  The upsurge of private external debt in the 1990s (Graph 16) made the balance-
sheet effects more relevant. Thus, a positive response of output to a (real) 
depreciation of the currency could have been weakened, as the expenditure-
switching channel could have been (partially) offset by the balance sheet effects. 
Graph 17 shows that the recursive OLS coefficient of the real exchange rate gap in an 
“IS curve” decreases and becomes less significant with time. This may be an indication of the 
two factors just mentioned.
12 Beyond the inspection of the “reduced form” relationship, some 
studies have found mixed results on the importance of balance sheet effects.  
On the one hand, using firm-level information, Echeverry et al (2003) find that investment 
responds negatively to a devaluation of the currency (although positively to the level of the 
exchange rate). Also, in their estimations larger firms and importing (more than exporting) 
firms are more prone to use external funding. On the other hand, Echavarría and Arbeláez 
(2003) also use firm-level data, but they find a positive effect of devaluations on sales, 
investment and profits, both in the aggregate and in different sectors of the economy. This is 
attributed to a competitiveness effect that is stronger than the balance-sheet effects. 
Moreover, according to their results, most of the firms that use external funding are currency-
matched (they are either exporters or foreign-owned). Tovar (2006) uses a DSGE model to 
show that the expenditure-switching effect is stronger than the balance-sheet effect for 
Colombia, so devaluations by the Central Bank have expansionary effects. However, a 
sudden stop both depreciates the currency and reduces output. This highlights the 
importance of the source of the shocks to the economy in explaining the (general equilibrium) 
relationship between output and the exchange rate. 
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The reduction in the levels of private foreign debt (Graph 16) suggests that balance-sheet 
effects are now less important than before. Further, there is evidence in the sense that larger 
firms with foreign indebtedness tend to use the forward market to hedge exchange rate risk 
(Kamil et al (2006)). 
(c)  Reaction of market interest rates to shifts in monetary policy 
The adoption of IT implied a dramatic smoothing of the overnight interbank rate (Graph 3). In 
principle, this enhanced the signals about the monetary policy stance and objectives. Given 
the financial structure of households and firms, and the development of the securities 
markets in Colombia, the financial system is still a particularly important component of the 
transmission mechanism. Hence, interest rate pass-through is a key issue. Graph 18 shows 
that financial market interest rates generally follow the policy rate.  
Studies for Colombia have found that, although there is a long-term relationship between 
policy and bank interest rates, interest rate pass-through is incomplete. Using descriptive 
statistics, Huertas et al (2005) estimate that a 1% change in the monetary policy rate 
produces a change of 0.26% in the 90-day CD rate in one week and a change of 0.6% over 
longer horizons. Further, using VAR models they found that commercial short term lending 
rates react one-for-one to the deposit rate, while the short-run pass-through is just 42% for 
the “preferential” short term lending rate. The authors suggest that the low transmission of 
the monetary policy interest rate to market interest rates can be explained by the weakening 
of the credit channel discussed above. Betancourt et al (2006) argue that, under imperfect 
substitution between foreign and domestic loans and deposits, interest rate pass-through 
may vary depending on macroeconomic conditions (external interest rates, risk premia, 
expectations of depreciation and output). They find some evidence that supports this 
hypothesis in Colombia. 
3. Summary 
The Colombian economy experienced several shocks in the past ten years. The permanent 
fall of inflation, the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) and a financial crisis altered the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Low inflation and IT reduced inflation 
persistence and helped to anchor inflation expectations, although the full effects in this 
regard are still to be observed. The evidence is less conclusive with respect to the changes 
of the responsiveness of inflation to domestic conditions (output or marginal cost gaps). 
Increased competition may have encouraged a higher degree of price flexibility, but a more 
stable inflation environment may have raised the sensitivity of aggregate supply to inflation 
surprises. Exchange rate pass-through to imported good prices rose, possibly due to a 
higher degree of trade openness. In contrast, imported good prices pass-through to CPI fell 
in response to exchange rate flexibility and a low inflation environment. The short-run money-
inflation relationship was broken in the presence of low inflation, exogenous shocks to the 
demand for money and a policy regime that stabilized short-run interest rates 
The sensitivity of aggregate demand to the interest rate varied with the indebtedness of 
private agents and the credit channel was severed after the financial crisis. The development 
of the domestic public bond market is expected to have important consequences for the 
transmission mechanism, as the use of long term financial instruments expands in the 
context of a low inflation environment. The private external debt build-up of the 1990s could 
have raised the importance of balance-sheet effects in the relationship between the 
exchange rate and economic activity variables. However, the reduction of external 
indebtedness and the increasing use of derivatives markets by real sector corporations have 
probably reduced the relevance of balance-sheet effects in recent years.  BIS Papers No 35  193
 
 
Finally, the IT regime implied a stabilization of short-run interest rates, making the monetary 
policy stance and objectives clearer to the public. Interest rate pass-through appears to be 
incomplete and seems to respond to the varying importance of the credit channel and the 












































































































CPI Inflation Inflation Targets  











































































































































  Source: Banco de la República. 



















































































  Sources: DANE; Banco de la República. 
 
Phillips curve 1980–1989  Phillips curve 1990–1999 
























































































































Non-Tradables Inflation Ouput Gap
 
























































































































Non-Tradables Inflation Ouput Gap
 
  Source: Banco de la República. 






































































































































































































































































































































Recursive OLS output gap coefficient of the equation  t t
M
t t t y c c c ε + + π + π = π − − − 1 3 2 2 1 1 ˆ  
t y ˆ  is the output gap (Hodrick and Prescott with priors),  t π  is annualized quarterly CPI inflation 
(excluding food items) and 
M
t π  is annualized quarterly PPI imported goods inflation. Sample: 1981Q1–
2006Q3. 































































































































Recursive OLS output gap coefficient of the equation t t
M
t t t y c c c ε + + π + π = π − − − 1 3 2 2 1 1 ˆ   
t y ˆ is the output gap (Hodrick and Prescott with priors),  t π  is annualized quarterly CPI inflation (excluding 
food items) and 
M
t π  is annualized quarterly PPI imported goods inflation. Sample: 1981Q1–2006Q3. 
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Kalman filter estimation of:  
M




t y c S ε + + π + Δ α + π α − = π − − − − 1 3
*








t y c ε + + π β + π β − = π − − − 1 3 2 1 ˆ ) 1 (  (2) 
α
− ε + δ + α = α t t t 1  (3)   
β
1 t t t ε + δ + β = β −  (4) 
Where: 
M
t π is annualized quarterly PPI imported goods inflation,  *
t π  is annualized 
quarterly CPI US inflation,  t S Δ  is the annualized quarterly depreciation rate of the 
Colombian peso against the US dollar,  t α  is the pass-through from depreciation 
to imported goods prices, 
B
t π  is annualized quarterly CPI inflation (excluding food 
items and some services) and  t β  is the pass-through from imported goods prices 
to CPI core inflation, and  t y ˆ  is the output gap (Hodrick and Prescott with priors). 
Source: Estimation by Julián Pérez, Banco de la República. 




































































































































 Source: Banco de la República. 
 
Monetary base 
Quarterly monetary aggregates 
(June 1964–September 1999) 
Annual percentage variation 
Monetary base 
Quarterly monetary aggregates 
(December 1999–September 2006) 
Annual percentage variation 
M3 
Quarterly monetary aggregates 
(June 1964–September 1999) 
Annual percentage variation
M3 
Quarterly monetary aggregates 
(December 1999–September 2006) 
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Coefficient of the real interest rate deviations from trend in:  t t t t t z c r c y c y ε + + + = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ  
Where  t y ˆ  is the output gap (Hodrick-Prescott with priors),  t rˆ  is the 90 day real interest rate gap (HP) 
and  t z ˆ  is the bilateral (US) real exchange rate gap (HP). 
Source: Estimation by Julián Pérez, Banco de la República. 
 
Graph 16 



















































































































































































Coefficient of the real exchange rate deviations from trend in:  t t t t t z c r c y c y ε + + + = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ  
Where  t y ˆ  is the output gap (Hodrick-Prescott with priors),  t rˆ  is the 90 day real interest rate gap (HP) and 
t z ˆ  is the bilateral (US) real exchange rate gap (HP). 













































































































































90-day deposit interest rate (DTF)
 




Inflation and inflation expectations 1999 
  Observed 
annual inflation 
Inflation expectations for 
December 1999 
December 1998    16.7%    15.9% 
March 1999    13.5%    13.5% 
June 1999    8.9%    12.2% 
September 1999    9.3%    9.9% 
December 1999    9.2%   
Memo item: Inflation target for 1999: 15%. 






Inflation expectations and credibility of inflation targets in Colombia 











(2)–(3)  Credibility 
1997   17.68   18.45    18.0   –0.3   –0.8   0.4   
1998   16.70   17.95    16.0    0.7   –1.2    2.0   
1999  9.23   15.789    15.0   –5.8   –6.6   0-8   
2000  8.75    9.89    10.0   –1.3   –1.1    –0.1  33.0 
2001  7.64    8.85   8.0   –0.4   –1.2   0.8  46.9 
2002    6.99    6.95   6.0    1.0    0.0   1.0  35.0 
2003    6.49    6.58   5.5    1.0   –0.1   1.1  42.0 
2004    5.50    6.13   5.5    0.0   –0.6   0.6  69.1 
2005  4.85    5.41   5.0   –0.2   –0.6   0.4  77.8 
2006  4.19    4.6   4.5   –0.3   –0.4   0.1  90.1 
Expectation: refers to the expected value of the end of year inflation measured at the beginning of the year. 
Credibility: refers to the percentage of people who believed (at the beginning of the year) that the target would 
be met for that year. Inflation expectations for the year 1997 correspond to the June Survey. 
Observed inflation for 2006 corresponds to annual yoy inflation until October 2006. 
Source: González and Hamann (2006). 
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García-Saltos (2006)  Quarterly 
AR (5) 












1  These coefficients refer to the estimation that controls for time-varying means of inflation.    
2  Standard error 
of 0.51.    





Inflation persistence: HNKPC estimates 












Bergljot et al (2006)
1 GDP 
Deflator 





  –0.01– –0.007




0.31–0.344 0.29–0.297  0.57–0.656  0.688–0.703 
Numbers reported correspond to minimum and maximum values of the estimated coefficients under different 
econometric specifications and estimation methods. 
1  Samples: 1987Q1–1999Q2 and 1987Q1–2005Q4.    
2  Samples: 1986Q2–1999Q2 and 1986Q2–2006Q1. 
 




Inflation response to marginal costs gap: HNKPC estimates 



















3  0.042–0.044 
Numbers reported correspond to minimum and maximum values of the estimated coefficients under different 
econometric specifications and estimation methods. 
1  Samples:1987Q1–1999Q2 and 1987Q1–2005Q4.    
2  Samples:1986Q2–1999Q2 and 1986Q2–2006Q1.    
3  Standard errors of 0.03.    




Ratio of relative price change volatility to inflation volatility 
 1982–1988  1989–1998  2000–today 
Variance of SA quarterly headline 
CPI inflation  3.15 1.31 0.22 
Food (subset)    0.64  2.53    3.55 
Rents   0.91  1.22    2.67 
Housing – tradable    1.79  1.51    5.26 
Housing – non tradable    0.96  0.78    1.79 
Clothing – tradable    0.85  0.92    0.88 
Clothing – non tradable    1.06  1.12    9.92 
Health – tradable    2.66  4.24    2.85 
Health – non tradable    2.18  0.88    1.87 
Education – tradable    1.83  5.57    1.90 
Education – non tradable    2.22  4.19    1.81 
Culture and recreation – tradable   3.07  1.40   6.91 
Culture and recreation – non tradable  30.12  9.91  18.48 
Transportation – tradable    7.37  4.66  15.16 
Other expenses – tradable    1.84  1.53    3.67 
Other expenses – non tradable    1.31  1.72    5.95 
Ratios = variance of quarterly SA price changes/variance of quarterly SA CPI headline inflation. Each sector 
includes only the items present in the CPI baskets of all periods. Sectors with heavily regulated prices are 
excluded. 




Sources of funding of corporations 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
A. Debt  63.0%  63.9%  63.2% 56.3% 51.6% 47.3% 
 Financial  system  41.8%  43.0% 41.0% 33.8% 29.7% 24.9% 
 Suppliers  17.6%  17.2%  17.3% 16.6% 16.3% 16.2% 
 Bonds  3.6%  3.7%  4.9% 6.0% 5.6% 6.2% 
B. Own  resources  37.0%  36.1% 36.8% 43.7% 48.4% 52.7% 
 Capital  23.4%  22.6%  22.3% 27.4% 26.9% 25.5% 
 Reserves  14.3%  14.6%  13.8% 14.2% 14.8% 15.6% 
 Current  profits  4.4%  4.1% 5.3% 7.0% 9.3%  11.8% 
  Previous periods profits  –5.1% –5.2% –4.7% –5.0% –2.6% –0.2% 
Total A + B  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source: Superintendencia de Sociedades y Superintendencia Financiera. 
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